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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELBERT B. RUMSEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent_,
Case No.
10181

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
Corporation of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
SUPPORTING BRIEF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
The defendant and appellant respectfully move
this court for a rehearing of the case at bar for the
following reasons:
I. It is the considered judgment and opinion of the

appellant that it is erroneous as a matter of law for
the court to affirm a proposition that any officer of
the appellant in this state can waive governmental im3
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munity of the said appellant's liability for. tort; that
the province of waiving such liability is entirely with
the State Legislature. That in the opinion of the writer
the court has not thoroughly considered the proposition
that previous decisions of cases rendered by this court
may be determinative of the issue in a subsequent case
when the capacity in which the appellant city was acting, proprietary or governmental, was neither pleaded
nor proved by the respondent in a jury trial and such
affirmation is prejudicial to the lawful rights of the
respondent and controverts the rule of stare decisis
approved and sustained by this court.
2. That the prevailing opinion and decision of this

court is erroneous as a matter of law and legal civil
procedure, in affirming that the respondent could lawfully reopen a jury trial after the jury had made and
entered its verdict and had by the court been discharged,
when the said respondent had requested a jury trial
covering all of the facts without exception.
3. That the court was in error in holding that pre-

vious cases were determinative of issues in this case
when the capacity in which the facility operated by
the appellant city was neither pleaded nor proved while
the court was in session sitting with a jury. The court
appears to assume that the capacity of the appellant
in operating the Wasatch Springs Plunge is proprietary without pleading or proof, except in ~ontrovention
of the rules of civil procedure in force and effect in this
state.

4
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SUPPORTING BRIEF
POINT I
THE PREVAILING OPINION AND DECISION OF THE COURT IS IN ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY OF ,.fHE DEFENDANT CAN BE
WAIVED BY THE ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY.
''

In the case of Hamilton v. Salt Lake City~ this court
said with approval:
"The California District Court of Appeals,
Second District Court, had this to say in a case
where injury had occurred upon a sidewalk and
where a 'verified claim for damages shall be presented in writing and filed with the clerk . . . '
St. Cal. 1931, P. 2475 §I. It is generally accepted
rule that a municipality and its officers are without power to waive compliance with the law in
such matters .... The statute does not authorize
a waiver nor does it provide any substitute for a
written verified claim. The authorities we have
cited quite generally hold that actual knowledge
on the part of officers of a municipality of the
facts required to be stated in a claim does not
dispense with the claim itself. In view of our
holding that the city could not be bound by any
alleged waiver, consisting as it would of an extension of time for fiiling the claim, it is unnecessary to point out the particulars in which the
complaint failed to show any aiuthority on the
part of defendants Curl and Macintyre to represent or act for the city except in the mere matter
of the investigation of the plaintiffs injuries and
the cause thereof."

5
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In the case of Cooper et al v. Butte County et al.J
17 Cal. App. 2d 43, 61 P.2d 516, the California Court
held that a provision of a statute requiring the filing
of a verified claim by any person seeking recovery
against the county for injuries sustained as a result
of dangerous or defective condition of the public street
or highway is not subject to wq.iver by the county) and
the county could not be estopped to set up failure to
comply with the statute as a defense in an action against
the county for injuries, where the claim was not verified. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City) 106 P.2d 1028, at
page 1032 of the Pacific Reporter, 99 Utah '362. (The
decision was unanimous.)
"Where a right is purely statutory and is granted
upon conditions, one who seeks to enforce the right
must by allegation and proof bring himself within the
cond~tions." ld. page 1030 of th_e Pacific R~porter.
So here, if the city cannot waive itS defense and
a county cannot waive such, then it is absolutely impossible for an officer to do so. It follows that if the
alleged discussion of governmental immunity, as held
at the pretrial of the case at bar, which the attorney
for the- city denies, such attorney could not waive the
defense of governmental immunity. One ponders why
the respondent's attorney. did not amend his complaint
then. Later he stated in his affidavit that he was taken
by surprise.
In the recent case of Morrison v. Horne_, 363 P.2d
1113, 12 U. 2nd 131, this court held:

6
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''As to estoppel: It would be unreasonable
unrealistic to conclude that a clerk or a ministerial officer having no authority to do so, could
bind the county to a variation of a zoning ordinance duly passed, to which everyone ··has notice
by its passage and publication, because a ministerial employee erred in characterizing the type
of property. The authorities generally supp<:>rt
such a conclusion, (1. A.L.R. 2nd 351 et seq.)
and we are constrained· to and do hold that the·
.assessor's erroneous description of the subject
property as commercial does not preclude the
zoning authorities from denying the permit for
the service station.''
Section 1.01 Immunity. "In absence of constitutional or. statutory provision, state generally
immune from tort liability. W aivBr is a "legislative question in almost all states. A few have
constitutional prohibitions against state being
sued'." Same rule is applicable to state agencies.
Personal Injury. Actions. Defenses. Damages.
Vol. 6, page 144.
"The rule is general that a municipal corporation is not liable for alleged tortious injuries
to the persons or property of individuals, when
engaged in the performance of public or governmental functions or duties. So far as municipal corporations exercise powers conferred on
them for purposes essentially public~ they stand
as does the. sovereignty whose agents they are~
and are not liable to be sued for any act or omission occurring while in the exercise of such
powers, unless by some statute the right of action
be given." Gillmor v. Salt Lake City~ 32 U. 180,
89 P. 714, where this court cited with approval
the above quotation from American and English
Encyclopedia of Law, page 1193.

7
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Grantee purchasers of a city deed executed by
mayor to certain street property dedicated as a public
alley, purchasers received no interest against the city,
this court saying:
"Balancing the justice of the cause, we find
there is no ground for an estoppel ·in pais as
against the city. In so doing we are mindful of
the fact that individuals dealing, with officers
should be able to rely upon their acts; that officers should act within th-e authority granted;
and that officers should be held to their acts and
covenants like individuals. However, the community is interested in vacating of streets and
the legislature has provided that they may be
vacated by ordinance, in order that the community may have notice of the acts of the commissions and thereby protect the private property holder and the coxymunity against such
actions." Tooele City v. Elkington_, 100 Wash.
485, 116 P.2d 406.
Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking for the court in an
unanimous decision in the case of Mary Ramirez v.
Ogden City_, held:
"It has long been recognized in this jurisdiction that a municipal corporation may act both
in a public and private capacity and that when
performing in a public or governmental function
it is not subject to tort liability. From time to
time certain judicial expressions have been uttered questioning the soundness of that rule as
a matter of policy. Whatever its desirability or
undesirability may be, it has long been firmly
established in our law by the ruling of the majority of this court. In deference to the prin-

8
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ciple of stare decisis we do not feel at liberty to
consider its merits or demerits. Any change
would be properly within the province of· the
legislature:'~ Ramirez v. Ogden City~ 279 P.2d
463, at page 464, 3 U. 2d 102. See also Davis
v. Provo City~ 1 U.2d 244,265 P.2d 415; Husband v. Salt Lake City~ 92 U. 449, 69 P.2d 491.
If then, only the legislature can lawfully make any
change in a city's immunity from tort liability and this
excludes the city commission and all courts, how can
this court consistently say that an assistant city attorney
can make a change by waiving the city's governmental
immunity?
True, the pretrial order had the following statement, "The parties agree that the plaintiff at the time
of his claimed injuries was a business invitee." Now
even if one could infer that this established the capacity
in which the city operated the Wasatch Springs Plunge,
it was not pleaded and unless it was so pleaded by the
plaintiff he could not raise in a jury trial such a proposition after the trial and discharge of the jury. Wade
v. Salt Lake City_, 10 U.2d 374, 353 P.2d 914.
From this statement in the pretrial order it is preposterous to believe that the city operated its swimming
pool in a proprietary capacity. One may be a business
invitee in applying for a city building permit or paying
taxes, yet that does not change the capacity of the city
in issuing the permit from acting in governmental to
a private or propietary capacity, nor the county in collection of taxes from acting in a governmental or
9
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public capacity to acting one of a private or proprietary
capacity. Yet in each instance the building permit
applicant and the taxpayer came to do business; they
are ,business invitees. Moreover, the city attorney or
his assistant could not waive governmental immunity
as a defense of the city.

POINT II.
THE PREVAILING OPINION AND DECISION OF THE COURT IS IN ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD A
RIGHT TO REOPEN A JURY TRIAL AFTER
THE VERDICT HAD BEEN MADE AND ENTERED AND THE JURY DISCHARGED.
In this case the lower court permitted the plaintiff
below to reopen a jury trial after the conclusion thereof
and discharge of the jury. The appellant claims that
there is no rule of civil procedure in force in this state
to permit this. Yet the prevailing opinon and decision
of this court holds this :
"Respondent Rumsey's complaint alleged that
the City operated VVasatch'Springs Plunge, and
that he paid an admission fee for entrance. However, whether those allegations were sufficient
to state a cause of action against the City or
whether it is necessary to allege more facts as
to the competitive nature of the operation so
that it can be determined from the complaint
rather than from evidence produced at trial
whether the operation is governmental or pro-

10
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prietary, need not be decided here. As shown
above, a pre-trial conference was held in this
case. In the pre-trial order it appears that the
parties agreed that at the time of the accident,
respondent was a business invitee. Such a fact
could only be material in the event the Wasatch
Springs Plunge was being operated in a proprietary capacity. If the Plunge was operated
in a governmental capacity the City would be
immune from liability regardless of the status
of the respondent. It would appear therefore
that the issue of whether the plunge was operated
in a governmental or proprietary capacity was
a matter which was disposed ·of in the pre-trial
conference and the issues for trial were therefore
under 'Rule 16 U.R.C.P. limited to the remaining issues of negligence and damages, unless
modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. We are more disposed to that conclusion
in view o fthe failure of the City to contradict
the affidavit of respondent's attorney filed in
opposition to the City's motion for a judgment
notwithst anding the verdict, that the issue of
governmental or proprietary operation was discussed ~nd that the City admitted that the W asatch Springs Plunge was operated in a proprietary capacity, ·as it could have done, if such
were not the facts, by filing an opposing affidavit as provided in Rule 59 (c) U.R.C.P."
There is nothing in the record to justify this cqnclusion, until after the case was reopened. The appellant's attorney took the attitude that the whole proceeding on the part of the respondent was, after rendition
of the verdict, illegal and did not comport with the rules
of civil procedure. Why did not the respondent amend
11
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his complaint at the pre-trial if the capacity in which
the city was acting was discussed? Yet one of the
grounds for reopening the trial was that he was surp.rised.
Rule 59 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
pertinent parts here, provide as follows:
" (a) Grounds. Subject to the 'provisions of
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the issues,
for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury_, the court may open
the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:

"***"
.
Rule 59 (a) was not designed to reopen a case tried
by a jury after its verdict has been rendered and judgment thereon entered, but under its provisions, it is
respectfully submitted that such may be done only
where the case is tried to the court without a jury and
one or more of the grounds set forth in the rule alleged.
The plaintiff below requested and was granted a
jury trial without specifying any particular issues to
be tried. Rule 38 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
" (c) Same: Specification of Issues. In his
demand a party may specify the issues which he
wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to

12
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have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so
triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for
only some of the issues, the other party within
10 days after service of the demand or such lesser
time as the court may order, may serve a demand
for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues
of fact in the action."
Rule 39 (a) provides as follows:
''When trial by jury has been demanded as
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the register of actions as a jury
action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall
be by jury~ unless (I) the parties of their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with
the court or. by an oral stipulation made in open
court and entered in the record, consent to trial
by the court sitting without a jury, or (2) the
court ·upon motion or of its own initiative finds
· that a right of trial by jury of some or all of
those issues does not exist, or (3} either. party
to t:l~e is~ue fails to appear at the trial."
: In 'the case ·of Houston Real Estate Investment
Co. v. Hechler~ 47 Utah 215, 152 P. 726, in which one
of t~e parties tried to convert a trial at law to one in
~quity after rendition of a jury verdict, claiming su.ch
verdict was advisory only and to the proposition t~is
court held:
"The case having, up to rendition of the verdict,
been treated by the parties and the court as one
trial by the jury, one of the parties having merely
suggested to the judge in chambers, during an
intermission, that he thought the case equitable
and the verdict advisory merely, the court was

13
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required to render judgment on the verdict,
and, could not make findings at variance with
the verdict, and thereon render judgment."
Neither could the lower court after the rendition
of the verdict convert a jury trial into one by the court
alone and make new findings upon facts not heard by
the jury. Such a procedure barred cross-examination by
the appellant and request .for special interrogatories
to be put to the jury if such were found necessary.

POINT III
THE PREVAILING OPINION AND THE
DECISION OF THE COURT IS IN ERROR
IN HOLDING THAT TWO PREVIOUS
CASES INVOLVING THE WASATCH
SPRINGS PLUNGE RESOLVES THE PROPRIETARY FUNCTION OF THE DEFENDANT CITY IN THE CASE AT BAR WHEN
NOT PLEADED BY THE PLAINTIFF.
The plaintiff Rumsey never pleaded any sufficient
facts showing that the city operated the Wasatch
Springs Plunge in a proprietary capacity while the
jury for whom he asked to hear the case, was in session
or before the jury trial came on for hearing. The appellant agrees with the dissenting opinion in this regard
and herein repeats that dissenting language:
"It is no answer to assert that in two previous
swimming pool cases we have affirmed the City's

14
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role as proprietor, since each case must stand or
fall on its own facts, and no end of stare decisis
can establish that a city can't operate a swimming. pool other than in a proprietary capacity.
"Nor is it an answer to say that the issue of
immunity conclusively was resolved against the
City by a pre-trial stipulation that Rumsey was
a 'business invitee,'-implying that such conclusion of necessity put the City in competition with
privately operated pools. Two good reasons
refute such conclusion:
"I) A person, for example, may be a business
invitee when he goes to the city treasurer to pay
the tax on the bu_siness he operates, but such a
circumstance could not ipso facto make the city
a businessman under any of. the rules incident
to a ga~e of musica~ chairs. The whole thing
is a matter ,of fact,-that's all,-and Rumsey
failed to allege or prove the conditionally precedential :required to construct his claim of tortious
compensability.
"2) Assuming arguendo, that the officials of
the city attempted to stipulate away the latter's
immunity, it couldn't be done, since a government official cannot sell the city's immunity down
the river with impunity.
"As to the second trial, the main opinion says
it was surplusage because the governmental immunity was resolved by stipulation at pretrial.
The latter fallacious conclusion followed the
equally fallacious assumption of the former.
Counsel for plaintiff himself did not entertain
any such gratuitous or novel assumption, since,
by the very motion for another trial, he conceded
that Rumsey had failed to plead or prove a proprietary role by the City."
15 .
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated and the errors of the main
opinion now called to the court's attention, it is respectfully submitted that the court should grant the appellant's petition for rehearing and the judgment of the
lower court reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

HOMER HOLMGREN
City Attorney for Salt Lake City

A. M. MARSDEN
Assistant City Attorney

ATTORNEYS FOR THE
APPELLANT
414 City & County Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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